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Abstract 
 
We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition 
structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to 
represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the 
relationship each individual has with her coalition members and with individuals outside her 
coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we 
propose the concepts of strong stability and of contractual stability. Contractual stability 
imposes that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the 
deviating players and their original coalition partners. Requiring the consent of coalition 
members under the simple majority or unanimity decision rule may help to reconcile stability 
and efficiency. Moreover, this new framework can provide in- sights that one cannot obtain if 
coalition formation and network formation are tackled separately and independently. 
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1 Introduction
The organization of agents into networks and groups has an important role in the determi-
nation of the outcome of many social and economic interactions. For instance, goods can
be traded and exchanged through networks, rather than markets, of buyers and sellers.
Networks also play important roles in providing mutual insurance especially in develop-
ing countries.1 Partitioning of societies into groups is also important in many contexts,
such as the provision of public goods and formation of alliances, cartels and federations.
The understanding of how and why such networks and groups form and the precise way
in which they a¤ect outcomes of social and economic interactions has been apprehended
separately by the coalition theory and the network theory.
One limit of both theories is that it cannot incorporate the existence of bilateral agree-
ments among agents belonging to di¤erent coalitions that is commonly observed in many
situations. A rst situation has to do with the formation of R&D joint ventures and of
bilateral R&D collaborations. On the one hand, Bloch (1995) has analyzed the forma-
tion of associations of rms, like R&D joint ventures or groups of rms adopting common
standards, in an oligopolistic industry. On the other hand, Goyal and Moraga-González
(2001) or Goyal and Joshi (2003) have analyzed the incentives for R&D collaboration be-
tween horizontally related rms by considering that collaboration links are bilateral and
are embedded within a broader network of similar links with other rms. However, it may
happen that rms A and B may decide to form an R&D joint venture while rms B and
C sign a bilateral R&D agreement. What is the architecture of the resulting collaboration
network and the structure of associations that are likely to emerge?
A second situation has to do with the formation of communication networks (roads,
railway tracks or waterways) and the provision of public goods. On the one hand, Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) have studied the incentives for agents to form links, and the strate-
gic stability of communication networks.2 Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) have studied
the incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links.
On the other hand, Ray and Vohra (2001) have studied the provision of (pure) public
goods when all agents can form coalitions and write binding agreements regarding their
1See Jackson (2008) for a comprehensive introduction to the theory of social and economic networks.
Kranton and Minehart (2000) have analyzed the endogenous formation of networks between input suppliers
and manufacturers while Mauleon, Sempere and Vannetelbosch (2011) have studied the formation of
networks between manufacturers and retailers. Wang and Watts (2006) have examined the formation of
buyer-seller networks when sellers can form an association of sellers to pool their customers. Bloch, Genicot
and Ray (2008) have studied bilateral insurance schemes across networks of individuals.
2Bloch and Dutta (2009) have analyzed the formation of communication networks when agents choose
how much to invest in each link. See also Jackson and Rogers (2005) and Johnson and Gilles (2000).
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contributions toward the provision of a (pure) public good. However, there are situations
where municipalities can form communication links but may belong to di¤erent regions,
and costs for providing those links or public services are shared at the regional level.3
What are the incentives for municipalities to form links and coalitions for the provision of
a (pure) public good?
There are many other situations where agents are part of a network and belong to
groups or coalitions. In labour markets, workers are linked to each other within each
rm through a hierarchy  that is, a network  and, at the same time workers may
group themselves into unions. Individuals are living their social interactions in clubs
or communities as well as through friendship networks. Countries can sign bilateral free
trade agreements or multilateral free trade agreements and may belong to customs unions.
Connections among di¤erent criminal gangs became a major feature of the organized crime
during the 1990s. Criminal gangs often develop contract relationships for the provision
of certain kinds of services, such as transportation, security, contract killing, and money
laundering.4
The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study
which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We dene
the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where
the network species the nature of the relationship each player has with her coalition
members and with players outside her coalition. This new framework forces us to redene
key notions of theory of networks, value functions and allocation rules, and to redene
existing solution concepts, strong stability and contractual stability.
A strongly stable coalitional network is a coalitional network which is stable against
changes in links and coalition structures by any coalition of players. The idea of contractual
stability is that adding or deleting a link needs the consent of coalition partners. For
instance, in the context of R&D alliances, rms may decide to have a common laboratory
with some partners, while developing bilateral R&D agreements with other partners. The
3Basque Y is the name given to the Spanish high-speed rail network being built since 2006 between the
three cities of the Basque Country Autonomous Community (Bilbao, Vitoria and San Sebastian). Since the
Basque Y will connect Spain with the European high-speed network, the decision of linking the three cities
and of the Y-shaped layout required the consent of the Basque Parliament and the Spanish authorities.
In addition, The Spanish government manages the construction of the stretches in the provinces of Alava
and Bizkaia while the Basque government takes care of the stretches in the province Gipuzkoa. See
http://www.euskalyvasca.com/en/home.html
4Colombian-Sicilian networks brought together Colombian cocaine suppliers with Sicilian groups pos-
sessing local knowledge, well-established heroin distribution networks, extensive bribery and corruption
networks, and a full-edged capability for money laundering. Italian and Russian criminal networks have
also forged cooperative relationships. See Williams (2001).
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signing of a bilateral R&D agreement may need the consent of those partners within the
common laboratory or joint venture. Moreover, the formation of new coalition structures
may need the consent of original coalition partners.5 Thus, once a coalition has been
formed, the consent of coalitional partners may be required in order to add or delete links
that a¤ect some coalition partners, or to modify the existing coalition. As in Drèze and
Greenberg (1980) the word "contractual" is used to reect the notion that coalitions are
contracts binding all members and subject to revision only with consent of coalitional
partners. Two di¤erent decision rules for consent are analyzed: simple majority and
unanimity.6
Looking at two models of coalitional network formation (a connections model with cost
sharing among municipalities and a R&D model where rms form R&D bilateral agree-
ments and belong to alliances), we observe that requiring the consent of coalition members
under the simple majority or unanimity decision rule may help to reconcile stability and
e¢ ciency.7 We also show that this new framework provides us results that one cannot
obtain if coalition formation and network formation are tackled separately and indepen-
dently. In general, contractually stable coalitional networks may fail to exist. We show
that under the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules, there always
exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule.
However, if the component-wise dictatorial allocation rule is adopted, then a contractually
stable coalitional network always exists only under the unanimity decision rule.
Our paper is related to Myerson (1980) who has studied situations in which communi-
cation is possible in conferences that can consist of an arbitrary number of players. Hence,
Myerson (1980) has modeled the communication possibilities of the players by means of hy-
pergraphs. Each element of an hypergraph is called a conference. Communication between
players can only take place within a conference if all players of the conference participate.
Since a conference can consist of several players, an hypergraph is a generalization of a
network, which has bilateral communication channels only. In our paper, coalitions do not
restrict how players can communicate to each other. Each players payo¤ depend both on
5Rules of exit in alliances (R&D joint ventures, partnerships) are either exit at the will of the larger
party subject to forewarning (simple majority rule) or exit without breach via a deadlock implemented by
the contractual board where only unanimous decisions are taken (unanimity rule). See Smith (2005).
6All individuals who are part of a criminal organization like the Hells Angels are sponsored by an o¢ cial
member and have to gain the approval of 100 percent of members in order to climb the hierarchy. See
Morselli (2009). Rules governing entry and exit in labor cooperatives may require the consent of partners.
A new partner will enter the cooperative only if (i) she wishes to come in; (ii) her new partners wish to
accept her; and (iii) she obtains from her former partners permission to withdraw (only if she was before
member of another cooperative). See Drèze and Greenberg (1980).
7Notice that strongly stable coalitional networks are not strongly e¢ cient in general.
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the network and the coalition structure.8 In addition, coalitions can represent contracts
where each coalition member is entitled to ones say when coalition partners add or delete
links to the network.9
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the framework of coali-
tional networks and we dene the concepts of strong stability and of contractual stability.
In Section 3 we consider two models to illustrate both the framework of coalitional net-
works and the concepts of strong stability and of contractual stability. In Section 4 we
derive some results about the existence of contractually stable coalitional networks and
we look whether e¢ cient coalitional networks are likely to be stable or not. In Section 5
we comment upon some of the features of the framework showing that it is general enough
to study the emergence of community structures. Section 6 concludes.
2 Coalitional networks
2.1 Notations and denitions
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the nite set of players who are connected in some network rela-
tionship and who belong to some coalitions or communities. A coalitional network (g; P )
consists of a network g 2 GN and a coalition structure P 2 P. A network g is simply
a list of which pairs of players are linked to each other with ij 2 g indicating that i
and j are linked under the network g. Let GN = fg j g  gNg denote the set of all
possible networks on N , where gN denotes the set of all subsets of N of size 2.10 A coali-
tion structure P = fS1; S2; :::; Smg is a collection of coalitions satisfying: Sa \ Sb = ?
for a 6= b, [ma=1Sa = N and Sa 6= ? for a = 1; :::;m. Let S(i) 2 P be the coali-
tion to which player i belongs. Let P denote the nite set of coalition structures. A
sub-coalitional network of (g; P ) is (h;Q) with h  g and Q a sub-collection of coali-
tions of P (possibly Q = P ). A sub-coalitional network (h;Q) of (g; P ) is nonempty if
both h contains at least one link and Q contains at least a coalition. For instance, if
N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8g, then (g; P ) = (f12; 23; 45; 56; 78g, ff1g; f2; 3; 4; 5g, f6; 7; 8gg) is
the coalitional network in which there is a link between players 1 and 2, a link between
8Caulier, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2011) have also considered situations where players are part of
a network and belong to coalitions. However, each players payo¤ only depends on the network, and so,
each players coalition only constrains her ability to add or delete links in the network.
9Modeling club structures as bipartite directed networks, Page and Wooders (2010) have formulated
the problem of club formation with multiple memberships as a noncooperative game of network formation.
See also Bloch and Dutta (2011) for a discussion of some recent literature on the endogenous formation of
coalitions and networks.
10Throughout the paper we use the notation  for weak inclusion and  for strict inclusion. Finally, #
will refer to the notion of cardinality.
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players 2 and 3, a link between players 4 and 5, a link between players 5 and 6, and a
link between players 7 and 8, and players 2, 3, 4 and 5 are in the same coalition while
players 6, 7 and 8 are in another coalition and player 1 is alone. This coalitional network
(g; P ) = (f12; 23; 45; 56; 78g; ff1g; f2; 3; 4; 5g; f6; 7; 8gg) is depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: A coalitional network
For any network g, let N(g) = fi j 9j such that ij 2 gg be the set of players who
have at least one link in the network g. For any given sub-collection Q of coalitions of P ,
N(Q) = fi 2 S j S 2 Qg is the set of players that belong to some coalition S 2 Q. Let
N(g+Q) = N(g)[N(Q). Finally, let N(g; P ) be the set of players who have at least one
link in the network g or that belong to a coalition S 2 P such that at least one member
of S has a link in the network g.
Denition 1. A nonempty sub-coalitional network (h;Q) is connected if for each i 2
N(h + Q) and j 2 N(h + Q) there exists a sequence of coalitions S1; S2; :::; SK with
i 2 S1 2 Q and j 2 SK 2 Q (K > 1) such that for any l 2 f1; :::;K   1g, Sl 2 Q and
there exists ilil+1 2 h with il 2 Sl and il+1 2 Sl+1.11
Under this denition of a connected sub-coalitional network, a coalition whose members
have no links is not considered as a connected sub-coalitional network.
Denition 2. A component of a coalitional network (g; P ) is a nonempty sub-coalitional
network (h;Q), with h  g and Q a sub-collection of coalitions of P , such that
(i) h = fij 2 g j 9 S; S0 2 Q (possibly S = S0) such that i 2 S and j 2 S0g,
(ii) for all S; S0 2 Q there exists a sequence of coalitions S1; S2; :::; SK with S1 = S and
SK = S0 such that for any l 2 f1; :::;K   1g, Sl 2 Q and there exists ilil+1 2 h with
il 2 Sl and il+1 2 Sl+1,
11A nonempty sub-coalitional network consisting of only one coalition is connected since by denition of
nonemptyness there is at least one link among players in that coalition.
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(iii) @ S 2 P , S =2 Q and ij 2 g such that i 2 Sl, Sl 2 Q and j 2 S.
A component (h;Q) of (g; P ) consists of a nonempty sub-network h of g and the coali-
tions in P that contain at least one player with a link in h and that are thus connected
through the links in h. The set of components of (g; P ) is denoted as C(g; P ) and con-
tains the maximal connected sub-coalitional networks of (g; P ). Under this denition of
a component, a coalition whose members have no links is not considered as a component.
Take the coalitional network (f12; 23; 45; 56; 78g; ff1g; f2; 3g; f4; 5g; f6; 7; 8gg) depicted in
Figure 2. The connected sub-coalitional networks are (f12; 23g, ff1g; f2; 3gg), (f23g,
ff2; 3gg), (f12g, ff1g, f2; 3gg), (f45; 56; 78g, ff4; 5g, f6; 7; 8gg), (f45g, ff4; 5gg), (f56g,
ff4; 5g, f6; 7; 8gg), (f78g, ff6; 7; 8gg). The components are the maximal connected sub-
coalitional networks, that is (f12; 23g; ff1g; f2; 3gg) and (f45; 56; 78g; ff4; 5g, f6; 7; 8gg).
These two components are depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: A coalitional network and its components
Let (g; P ) denote the partition of N induced by (g; P ). That is, S 2 (g; P ) if
and only if (i) there exists (h;Q) 2 C(g; P ) such that S = N(h;Q), or (ii) S 2 P such
that for all i 2 S, i =2 N(g; P ). (f12; 23; 45; 56; 78g; ff1g; f2; 3g; f4; 5g; f6; 7; 8gg) =
ff1; 2; 3g; f4; 5; 6; 7gg in the previous example.
2.2 Partition value functions and allocation rules
Di¤erent coalitional networks lead to di¤erent values of overall production or overall utility
to players. These various possible valuations are represented via a partition value function.
A partition value function is a function v : GN  P ! R. Let V be the set of all possible
partition value functions. A partition value function only keeps track of how the total
societal value varies across di¤erent coalitional networks. The calculation of partition value
is a richer object than a partition function in a partition game and/or a value function in
a network game, as it allows the value generated to depend both on the coalition structure
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and on the network structure. A partition value function v is component additive ifX
(h;Q)2C(g;P )
v(h;Q) = v(g; P ).
Component additivity is a condition that rules out externalities across components but
still allows them within components. A coalitional network (g; P ) is strongly e¢ cient
relative to a partition value function v if v(g; P )  v(g0; P 0) for all g0 2 GN and all P 0 2 P.
We also wish to keep track of how that value is allocated or distributed among the
players in any coalitional networks. An allocation rule is a function Y : GN PV ! RN
such thatX
i2N
Yi(g; P; v) = v(g; P ) for all v, g and P .
It is important to note that an allocation rule depends on g, P and v. This allows
an allocation rule to take full account of a player is role in the network and in the
coalition structure. This includes not only what the network conguration and coalition
structure are, but also and how the value generated depends on the overall network and
coalition structure. A coalitional network (g; P ) is Pareto e¢ cient relative to partition
value function v and allocation rule Y if no g0 2 GN and no P 0 2 P exist such that
Yi(g
0; P 0; v)  Yi(g; P; v) for all i with strict inequality for some i.
We propose next three allocation rules that will be helpful for obtaining existence of
stable coalitional networks. For any component additive partition value function v 2 V,
the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce is such that for any (h;Q) 2 C(g; P )
and each i 2 N(h;Q),
Y cei (g; P; v) =
v(h;Q)
#N(h;Q)
.
For any partition value function v 2 V that is not component additive, Y ce(g; P; v) splits
the value v(g; P ) equally among all players. The component-wise egalitarian rule is one in
which the value of each component is split equally among the members of the component
provided the partition value function is component additive.
Let iS be the player i 2 S, S  N , such that i  j for all j 2 S. For any component
additive partition value function v 2 V, the component-wise dictatorial allocation rule Y cd
is such that for any (h;Q) 2 C(g; P ) and each S 2 Q,
Y cdi (g; P; v) =
(
v(h;Q)=#Q i = iS ,
0 8i 2 S, i 6= iS
For any partition value function v 2 V that is not component additive, Y cd(g; P; v) splits
the value v(g; P ) equally among all players. The component-wise dictatorial rule is one in
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which the value of each component is split equally among one member of each coalition
belonging to the component provided the partition value function is component additive.
For any component additive partition value function v 2 V, the component-wise ma-
joritarian allocation rule Y cm is such that for any (h;Q) 2 C(g; P ),
Y cmi (g; P; v) =
8<: v(h;Q)=
P
S2Q
h
#S
2 + mod[#S; 2]
i
8i 2 S0  S
0 8i 2 S00  S
with S0 \ S00 = ?, S0 [ S00 = S, #S0  #S00  #S2   mod[#S; 2], and iS
00
> j, 8j 2 S0,
with iS
00
being the player i 2 S00, such that i  j for all j 2 S00. For any partition
value function v 2 V that is not component additive, Y cm(g; P; v) splits the value v(g; P )
equally among all players. The component-wise majoritarian rule is one in which the value
of each component is split equally among half members of each coalition belonging to the
component provided the partition value function is component additive.
2.3 Notions of stability
A simple way to analyze the coalitional networks that one might expect to emerge in the
long run is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that no group of players benets
from altering the coalitional network. What about possible deviations?
Denition 3. A coalitional network (g0; P 0) is obtainable from (g; P ) via S, S  N , if
(i) ij 2 g0 and ij =2 g implies fi; jg  S, and
(ii) ij =2 g0 and ij 2 g implies fi; jg \ S 6= ?, and
(iii) fS0 2 P 0 j S0  N n Sg = fT n S j T 2 P; T n S 6= ;g, and
(iv) 9 fS01; S02; :::; S0mg  P 0 such that [ml=1S0l = S.
Condition (i) asks that any new links that are added can only be between players
inside S. Condition (ii) requires that there must be at least one player belonging to S for
the deletion of a link.12 Condition (iii) embodies the assumption that no simultaneous
deviations are possible. So if players in S deviate leaving their coalition in P , non-deviating
players do not move. Condition (iv) allows deviating players in S to form one or several
coalitions in the new coalitional structure P 0. Non-deviating players do not belong to
those new coalitions.
12These rst two conditions have been introduced by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) to dene
the netwoks obtainable from a given network by a coalition S.
8
Denition 4. A coalitional network (g; P ) is strongly stable with respect to partition
value function v and allocation rule Y if for any S  N , (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P ) via
S and i 2 S such that Yi(g0; P 0; v) > Yi(g; P; v), there exists j 2 S such that Yj(g0; P 0; v) 
Yj(g; P; v).
A coalitional network is said to be strongly stable if for any feasible deviation by a
coalition S from (g; P ) to (g0; P 0) we have that if some player i 2 S gains then at least
another player j 2 S should not gain and block the deviation from (g; P ) to (g0; P 0).
This denition of strong stability is due to Dutta and Mutuswami (1997). The denition
of strong stability of Dutta and Mutuswami considers a deviation to be valid only if all
members of a deviating coalition are strictly better o¤, while the denition of Jackson
and van den Nouweland (2005) is slightly stronger by allowing for a deviation to be valid
if some members are strictly better o¤ and others are weakly better o¤.13 The weaker
denition has sense when transfers among players are not possible.
As in Drèze and Greenberg (1980), we may assume that coalitions are contracts binding
all members and that adding or deleting a link or modifying the existing coalition requires
the consent of coalition partners. Two di¤erent decision rules for consent are analyzed:
simple majority and unanimity.
Denition 5. A coalitional network (g; P ) is contractually stable under the unanimity
decision rule with respect to partition value function v and allocation rule Y if for any
S  N , (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P ) via S and i 2 S such that Yi(g0; P 0; v) > Yi(g; P; v),
there exists k 2 S(j) with S(j) 2 P and j 2 S such that Yk(g0; P 0; v)  Yk(g; P; v).
Under the unanimity decision rule, the move from a coalitional network (g; P ) to any
obtainable coalitional network (g0; P 0) needs the consent of every deviating player as well
as the consent of every member of the initial coalitions of the deviating players. Then,
a coalitional network is contractually stable if any deviating player or any member of
the former coalitions of the deviating players is not better o¤ from the deviation to any
obtainable coalitional network (g0; P 0).
Denition 6. A coalitional network (g; P ) is contractually stable under the simple major-
ity decision rule with respect to partition value function v and allocation rule Y if for any
13Notice that Jackson and van den Nouwelands (2005) version of strongly stability implies pairwise
stability from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if no player benets from severing
one of her links and no two players benet from adding a link between them, with one beneting strictly
and the other at least weakly. However, Dutta and Mutuswamis (1997) version of strongly stability only
implies the strict version of pairwise stability when no two players strictly benet from adding a link
between them.
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S  N , (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P ) via S and i 2 S such that Yi(g0; P 0; v) > Yi(g; P; v),
there exists
(i) l 2 S such that Yl(g0; P 0; v)  Yl(g; P; v), or
(ii) bS  S(j) with S(j) 2 P and j 2 S such that Yk(g0; P 0; v)  Yk(g; P; v) for all k 2 bS
and #bS  #S(j)=2.
Under the simple majority decision rule, the move from a coalitional network (g; P )
to any obtainable coalitional network (g0; P 0) needs the consent of every deviating player
as well as the consent of more than half members of each initial coalition of the deviating
players. Then, a coalitional network is contractually stable if any deviating player or half
members of some former coalition of the deviating players are not better o¤ from the
deviation to any obtainable coalitional network (g0; P 0). Obviously, a coalitional network
that is strongly stable is contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule,
and a coalitional network that is contractually stable under the simple majority decision
rule is contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule. In fact each decision rule
requires the consent of coalitional partners above some proportion for a deviation not to
be blocked. Let q denote the proportion of coalition partners whose consent is needed for
a deviation not to be blocked, 0  q  1. For instance, the simple majority decision rule
reverts to a proportion q > 12 while the unanimity decision rule reverts to a quota q = 1.
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3 Two models of coalitional networks
3.1 The connections model with cost sharing
To illustrate both the framework of coalitional networks and the concepts of contractual
stability we consider an alternative version of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) symmetric
connections model. Municipalities form communication links (roads, railway tracks or
waterways) with each other in order to be connected and form coalitions in order to
share communication costs. If municipality i is "connected" to municipality j, by a path
of t links, then municipality i receives a payo¤ of t from her indirect connection with
municipality j. It is assumed that 0 <  < 1, and so the payo¤ t decreases as the path
connecting municipalities i and j increases; thus travelling a long distance is less valuable.
14The relationship between contractual stability under any decision rule embodied by a proportion q is
obvious: a proportion q0 < q renes stability. That is, the set of contractually stable coalitional networks
under q0 is (weakly) included in the set of contractually stable coalitional networks under q. Indeed, the
probability to block a deviation is greater the higher the proportion q. When the proportion approaches
zero (q ! 0), coalitional membership has no matter in terms of consent.
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Each direct link ij results in a cost c to both i and j. This cost can be interpreted as the
cost a municipality must spend for building and maintaining a direct link with another
municipality. The communication costs are shared equally within coalitions. Municipality
is payo¤ from a network g in a coalition S(i) 2 P is given by
Yi(g; P ) =
X
j 6=i
t(ij)   1
#S(i)
X
j2S(i)
0@ X
k:jk2g
c
1A ,
where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting t(ij) =1
if there is no path between i and j). Inside each coalition, the consent of members may
be needed in order to modify the network and/or the coalition structure. The contractu-
ally stable coalitional networks in case of three municipalities under the simple majority
decision rule are depicted in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Stable coalitional networks in the connections model with costs shared within groups
The contractually stable coalitional networks in case of three municipalities under the
simple majority decision rule are (?; ff1g; f2g; f3gg) if and only if c > maxf3(+2)=4; g;
(f12; 13; 23g; ff1g; f2g; f3gg) if and only if c <  2; (?; ff1; 2; 3gg) if and only if c > 3=2;
(f12; 13; 23g; ff1; 2; 3gg) if and only if c < minf   2; 3=4g; (?; ffi; jg; fkgg) if and
only if c > maxf3( + 2)=4; g; (fij; ikg; ffig; fjg; fkgg) if and only if    2 < c < ;
(fij; ikg; ffig; fj; kgg) if and only if    2 < c < ; (fij; ikg; ffi; jg; fkgg) if and only
if c < minf + 2; 4=3g; (fij; ik; kjg; ffi; jg; fkgg) if and only if c <    2. While
the allocation rule depends on the coalitions in P , the partition value function does not
depend on the coalitions in P . Hence, the strongly e¢ cient coalitional networks are
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like the strongly e¢ cient networks of the original symmetric connections model where
each municipality only bears her own costs. The strongly e¢ cient coalitional networks
are (fij; ik; kjg; ffig; fjg; fkgg), (fij; ik; kjg; ffi; jg; fkgg) and (fij; ik; kjg; ffi; j; kgg) if
c <    2; (fij; ikg; ffig; fjg; fkgg), (fij; ikg; ffi; jg; fkgg), (fij; ikg; ffig; fj; kgg) and
(fij; ikg; ffi; j; kgg) if    2 < c <  + (2)=2; and, (?; ffig; fjg; fkgg), (?; ffi; jg; fkgg)
and (?; ffi; j; kgg) if  + (2)=2 < c. We have that, for any parameter values, there
is always a strongly e¢ cient coalitional network which is contractually stable under the
simple majority decision rule.
But what happens for more than three municipalities? For  < c < +((n 2)=2)2, the
strongly e¢ cient coalitional networks consist of a star network associated to any coalition
structure but is never strongly stable. A coalitional network consisting of a star network
associated to a coalition structure where (i) the central municipality is a singleton (she is
alone in a coalition) is never contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule
because this central municipality has incentives to cut links, (ii) the central municipality
belongs to a coalition consisting of at least three municipalities is never contractually
stable under the simple majority rule because the partners of the central municipality
have incentives to break the coalition to become singletons. The last case to be considered
is the star network associated to a coalition structure where the central municipality forms
a coalition with a single partner. If  + ((n   2)=n) < c <  + ((n   2)=2)2 then both
the central municipality and her partner have incentives to cut all their links. However, if
 < c < minf + ((n  2)=n);  + ((n  2)=2)2g, then the central municipalitys partner
does not want to cut the link she has with the central municipality. We conclude that,
for  + ((n   2)=n) < c <  + ((n   2)=2)2, no strongly e¢ cient coalitional network is
contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule; for  < c < minf + ((n  
2)=n); +((n 2)=2)2g, the coalitional network consisting of the star network associated
to a coalition structure where the central municipality forms a coalition with a single
partner is strongly e¢ cient and contractually stable under the simple majority decision
rule. For c < (1  ), it is straightforward that the strongly e¢ cient coalitional network
consisting of the complete network and the coalition structure where all municipalities are
singletons is contractually stable under the simple majority rule.
Proposition 1. Take the symmetric connections model with communication costs shared
within groups. For c < (1   ), (g; P ) is contractually stable under the simple majority
rule and strongly e¢ cient if g is the complete network and #S(i) = 1 8i 2 N . For
 < c < minf + ((n   2)=n);  + ((n   2)=2)2g, (g; P ) is contractually stable under
the simple majority rule and strongly e¢ cient if g is a star network encompassing all
municipalities and #S(i) = 2, S(i) 2 P with i being the center of the star network.
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For  + ((n  2)=n) < c <  + ((n  2)=2)2, no strongly e¢ cient (g; P ) is contractually
stable under the simple majority rule. For  + ((n   2)=2)2 < c, (g; P ) is contractually
stable under the simple majority rule and strongly e¢ cient if g is the empty network and
#S(i) = 1 8i 2 N .
3.2 R&D coalitional networks
We develop a three-stage game in a setting with n competing rms that produce some
homogeneous good. Let qi denote the quantity of the good produced by rm i 2 N . In
the rst stage, rms decide the bilateral R&D collaborations (or links) they are going to
establish and the alliances (or coalitions) they want to form in order to maximize their
respective prots. The collection of pairwise links between the rms and the alliances
dene a R&D coalitional network. In the second stage, rms can undertake R&D to look
for cost reducing innovations. The cost function for technology is given by 2 (xi)
2, where
xi is the research output undertaken by rm i, i 2 N . Firms belonging to the same alliance
(or coalition) decide the amount of research output that each of them has to undertake in
order to maximize the joint prots of the alliance. Given a network g and the collection
of research outputs fx1; :::; xng, the marginal cost of production of rm i is given by
ci(g; P ) = c  xi(g; P ) 
X
j:ij2g
or j2S(i)
xj(g; P ) 
X
j:ij =2g
and j =2S(i)
  xj(g; P )
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) measures the public knowledge spillovers obtained from
indirectly connected partners and unconnected rms that are not in the same alliance.
Notice that the transmission of knowledge among linked rms and among rms in the
same alliance is fully appropriated. In the third stage, rms compete in quantities in
the oligopolistic market, taking as given the costs of production. Let p(q) = a   q be
the market-clearing price when aggregate quantity on the market is q  Pi2N qi. More
precisely, p(q) = a   q for q < a, and p(q) = 0 otherwise, with a > 0. Given a R&D
coalitional network (g; P ), the prots of rm i 2 N are given by
Yi(g; P ) =
0@a  qi(g; P ) X
j 6=i
qj(g; P )  ci(g; P )
1A  qi(g; P )  
2
(xi(g; P ))
2 .
This three-stage game is solved backwards. We rst look for subgame perfect equilibria
of the multi-stage game made up of stage two to stage three. Then, stage one is solved
using the concept of contractual stability.
Suppose that n = 3 and  = 4 (minimum value for  that ensures that all equi-
librium outputs are positive for any  2 (0; 1)). The third stage equilibrium can be
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easily computed as a function of the di¤erent rmsmarginal costs for any given coali-
tional network (g; P ). The equilibrium quantity and the prots of rm i in any coali-
tional network (g; P ) are: qi(c1(g; P ); c2(g; P ); c3(g; P )) =
a 4ci+
P
j cj
4 and Yi(g; P ) =
(qi(c1(g; P ); c2(g; P ); c3(g; P ))
2   2 (xi(g; P ))2 with i 2 N = f1; 2; 3g. Next equilibrium
research output levels are computed according to the R&D structure dened by any given
coalitional network (g; P ). Finally, the contractually stable coalitional networks under the
unanimity decision rule are depicted in Figure 4.15
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Figure 4: Contractually Stable coalitional networks in the RD model
Proposition 2. The contractually stable coalitional networks under the unanimity deci-
sion rule are:
a) (?; ffi; jg; fkgg) and (fijg; ffi; jg; fkgg), one coalition of two rms (linked or not) and
an isolated singleton rm if  < 12 .
b) (fikg; ffi; jg; fkgg) and (fij; ikg; ffi; jg; fkgg), one coalition of two rms (linked or
not) with one of the two rms linked to the singleton rm if  < 0:737.
c) (g; ffNgg), the grand coalition of rms with any possible network g, 8g 2 G3.
Note that the set of contractually stable coalitional networks under the unanimity
decision rule includes three di¤erent types of coalitional networks. It is interesting to note
that the network structure inside a coalition of a contractually stable coalitional network
does not a¤ect the stability of the coalitional network since the transmission of information
can take place through the link or through the coalition. All rms get the same prots in
(g; ffNgg) regardless of the particular g. This is a general fact in this example. In case of
15All equilibrium expressions and proofs are available from the authors upon request.
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a coalition with two rms, the existence or not of a link between them does not a¤ect the
level of prots they obtain. In case of no public spillovers, i.e.  = 0, all the coalitional
networks in a), b) and c) are contractually stable. However, as the level of public spillovers
increases the set of contractually stable coalitional networks under the unanimity decision
rule shrinks. The asymmetric coalitional networks become unstable since the three rms
gain moving to the grand coalition due to the fact that a larger  reduces the strategic
use of R&D output levels.
One interesting question is to investigate whether the e¢ cient coalitional networks
are included in the set of contractually stable coalitional networks. Note that, for this
example, e¢ ciency is attained when the grand coalition forms since joint industry prots
are maximized when the equilibrium research outputs are set jointly. Moreover, since
links are not costly, any network inside the grand coalition give rises the same level of
prots. Hence, the e¢ cient coalitional networks are (g; ffNgg) for all g 2 G3. Thus,
the e¢ cient coalitional networks are contractually stable coalitional networks under the
unanimity decision rule for any .
Proposition 3. The contractually stable coalitional networks under the simple majority
decision rule are:
a) (?; ffi; jg; fkgg) and (fijg; ffi; jg; fkgg), one coalition of two rms (linked or not) and
an isolated singleton rm if  < 12 .
b) (fikg; ffi; jg; fkgg) and (fij; ikg; ffi; jg; fkgg), one coalition of two rms (linked or
not) with one of the two rms linked to the singleton rm if  < 0:737.
c) (fij; ik; jkg; ffNgg) and (fij; ikg; ffNgg), the grand coalition of rms with the com-
plete or the star networks for all .
d) (?; ffNgg) and (fijg; ffNgg), the grand coalition of rms with the empty or the par-
tially connected networks for all  > 12 .
The change in the decision rule a¤ects the set of contractually stable coalitional net-
works for small public spillovers. The coalitional networks with the empty or partially
connected networks and the grand coalition (part d) in Proposition 3) are unstable against
deviations of two rms (a simple majority of rms) who form a coalition leaving behind
the other rm. By doing so, the deviating rms obtain a signicant strategic advantage
over the rm left alone that implies higher prots than the ones obtained under the grand
coalition. Therefore, when  = 0, only parts a), b) and c) of Proposition 3 apply. How-
ever, coalitional networks with the complete or star networks and the grand coalition are
contractually stable for any value of . This is an interesting illustration of the claim
that coalition formation and network formation cannot be tackled independently. In this
particular example, any change in the network structure inside a coalition has no e¤ect
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on rms prots but it has consequences on the stability of coalitional networks. In con-
trast with the unanimity decision rule case, not all the e¢ cient coalitional networks are
contractually stable coalitional networks under the simple majority decision rule for any
.
Finally, we investigate whether the e¢ cient coalitional networks are contractually sta-
ble under the unanimity and the simple majority decision rules for an arbitrary number of
rms, n  3. First of all, note that the research outputs chosen under the grand coalition
maximize the aggregate prots of the industry. Therefore, the e¢ cient coalitional networks
are contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule since any potential improve-
ment of a group of deviating rms reduces the prots of the non-deviating rms. Hence,
any deviation from the grand coalition will be blocked. Take now the case of no public
spillovers,  = 0. Then, the e¢ cient coalitional network (?; ffNgg) is not contractually
stable under the simple majority decision rule. The deviation of a coalition consisting of
n   1 rms to (?; ffN   ig; figg) is protable for the deviating rms and they have the
majority inside the grand coalition. However, if  = 1, the e¢ cient coalitional network
(?; ffNgg) is stable against the same type of deviation. In fact, it is stable against any
deviation that splits the grand coalition into two coalitions. Indeed, the coalition that
benets by deviating it is always the smaller one. Then, the non-deviating rms can
always block the deviation of the smaller coalition.
4 Stability and Pareto e¢ ciency
There can be many contractually stable coalitional networks in the connections model or
in the R&D model. However, it is easy to nd an example where a contractually stable
coalitional network fails to exist. Take N = f1; 2; 3g and P = ff1g; f2g; f3gg. Payo¤s
are Yi(?; P ) = 1, Y1(f23g; P ) = 1, Y2(f23g; P ) = 2, Y3(f23g; P ) = 4, Y1(f13g; P ) = 4,
Y2(f13g; P ) = 1, Y3(f13g; P ) = 2, Y1(f12g; P ) = 2, Y2(f12g; P ) = 4, Y3(f12g; P ) = 1,
Yi(f13; 23g; P ) = 3, Yi(f12; 13g; P ) = 3, Yi(f12; 23g; P ) = 3, Yi(f12; 13; 23g; P ) = 1, and
Yi(g; P ) = 0 8i 2 N , 8P 6= P , 8g 2 GN . The coalitional networks with positive payo¤s
are depicted in Figure 4.
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and Yi(g; P ) = 0 8i 2 N;
8P 6= ff1g; f2g; f3gg;
8g 2 GN :
Figure 4: Non-existence of contractually stable networks
We now study the existence of stable coalitional networks. Let gS be the set of all
subsets of S  N of size 2. Let
(h;Q)[S] = argmax
hgS ;QP
s.t. (h;Q) is connected
v(h;Q)
#N(h;Q)
be the connected sub-coalitional network with the highest per capita value out of those
that can be formed by players in S  N . Given a component additive partition value
function v, nd a coalitional network (g; P )v;ce through the following algorithm. Pick
some (g1; Q1) 2 (h;Q)[N ]. Next, pick some (g2; Q2) 2 (h;Q)[N n N(g1; Q1)]. At stage k
pick some (gk; Qk) 2 (h;Q)[N n[ik 1N(gi; Qi)]. Since N is nite this process stops after
a nite number K of stages. The union of the components picked in this way denes a
coalitional network (g; P )v;ce which is Pareto e¢ cient.16
Proposition 4. Under a component additive partition value function v, a coalitional net-
work (g; P )v;ce dened by the preceding algorithm is strongly stable under the component-
wise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce.
Proof. Given the algorithm and the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce, the
players in N(g1; Q1) obtain the highest possible payo¤ they can get. So, no player in
16Jackson (2005) has proposed a similar algorithm for nding a network that is pairwise stable and
Pareto e¢ cient under the classic component-wise egalitarian rule.
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N(g1; Q1) will deviate from (g; P )v;ce. Players in any N(gk; Qk), k = 2; :::;K, obtain the
highest possible payo¤ they can get among the players in N n [ik 1N(gi; Qi). However,
their payo¤ is smaller than the payo¤of players in N(gj ; Qj) with j = 1; :::; k 1. Although
players in N(gk; Qk) would like to be in any N(gj ; Qj) with j = 1; :::; k   1, no player in
that components would like to change its position in N(gj ; Qj), j = 1; :::; k   1, with the
position of any player in N(gk; Qk).
Let
(h;Q)[S] = argmax
hgS ;QP s.t.
(h;Q) is connected
v(h;Q) P
S02Q

#S0
2 + mod[#S
0; 2]
! .
be the connected sub-coalitional network out of those that can be formed by players in
S  N with the highest per capita value for a majority of players in each S0, S0 2 Q. Given
a component additive partition value function v, a similar algorithm as before provides us
a coalitional network (g; P )v;cm.
Proposition 5. Under a component additive partition value function v, a coalitional
network (g; P )v;cm dened by the preceding algorithm is contractually stable under the
simple majority decision rule and the component-wise majoritarian allocation rule Y cm.
Proof. Given the algorithm and the component-wise majoritarian allocation rule Y cm, a
majority of players in each coalition S0, S0 2 Q1, in the component (g1; Q1) 2 (h;Q)[N ]
obtain the highest possible payo¤ they can get. So, any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cm
via some coalition S containing some members of N(g1; Q1) would be blocked by the
majority of players in each coalition S0, S0 2 Q1. Moreover, a majority of players in each
coalition S0, S0 2 Qk, k = 2; :::;K, in the component (gk; Qk) 2 (h;Q)[Nn[ik 1N(gi; Qi)]
obtain the highest possible payo¤ they can get among the players in N n[ik 1N(gi; Qi).
So, any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cm via some coalition S  N n [ik 1N(gi; Qi)
containing some members of N(gk; Qk) would be blocked by the majority of players in
each coalition S0, S0 2 Qk. However, the majority of players in each S0, S0 2 Qk, in the
component (gk; Qk) receive a smaller payo¤ than a majority of players in each S0, S0 2 Qj ,
in each component (gj ; Qj), for j = 1; :::; k 1. But any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cm
via S, involving some players in some (gj ; Qj), j = 1; :::; k   1, would be blocked by a
majority of players in each coalition S0, S0 2 Qj .
Let
(h;Q)[S] = argmax
hgS ;QP
s.t. (h;Q) is connected
v(h;Q)
#Q
.
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be the connected sub-coalitional network out of those that can be formed by players in
S  N with the highest per capita value for a single player in each S0, S0  Q. Given a
component additive partition value function v, a similar algorithm as before provides us
a coalitional network (g; P )v;cd.
Proposition 6. Under a component additive partition value function v, a coalitional
network (g; P )v;cd dened by the preceding algorithm is contractually stable under the una-
nimity decision rule and the component-wise dictatorial allocation rule Y cd.
Proof. Given the algorithm and the component-wise dictatorial allocation rule Y cd, a
single player in each coalition S0, S0 2 Q1, in the component (g1; Q1) 2 (h;Q)[N ] obtains
the highest possible payo¤ she can get. So, any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cm via some
coalition S containing some members of N(g1; Q1) would be blocked by the player that
obtains the highest possible payo¤ in each coalition S0, S0 2 Q1. Moreover, a single player
in each coalition S0, S0 2 Qk, in the component (gk; Qk) 2 (h;Q)[N n [ik 1N(gi; Qi)]
obtains the highest possible payo¤ she can get among the players in N n[ik 1N(gi; Qi)).
So, any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cd via some coalition S  N n [ik 1N(gi; Qi)
containing some members of N(gk; Qk) would be blocked by the player obtaining the
highest payo¤ in each coalition S0, S0 2 Qk. Finally, any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cd
via S, involving some players in some (gj ; Qj), j = 1; :::; k   1, would be blocked by the
player receiving the highest payo¤ in each coalition S0, S0 2 Qj .
5 Community structures
Many real world social and economic networks are composed of many communities of
nodes, where the nodes of the same community are highly connected, while there are few
links between the nodes of di¤erent communities.17 The framework of coalitional networks
is general enough to study the emergence of "community structures" where links between
individuals belonging to di¤erent communities are infeasible. Suppose that two players
can be linked to each other only if they belong to the same coalition. Then, the set of
feasible coalitional networks becomes
f(g; P ) 2 GN  P j ij 2 g only if S(i) = S(j)g.
This situation may be interpreted as a limit case of community structures.
Proposition 7. Suppose that two players can be linked to each other only if they belong to
the same coalition. Then, under a component additive partition value function v, strongly
17See for instance Jackson (2008) or Wasserman and Faust (1994). Research on community structures
mainly deals with the detection of these communities in network data.
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e¢ cient community structures are always contractually stable under the unanimity decision
rule.
If there are no externalities among coalitions (which coincide with components since
players cannot be linked to players belonging to other coalitions), then it is possible to
stabilize the strongly e¢ cient community structures thanks to the unanimity decision rule,
and this, whatever the allocation rule. However, once only the consent of more than half
members of the initial coalitions of the deviating players is required, then we need to
impose a specic allocation rule to stabilize the strongly e¢ cient community structures.
Proposition 8. Suppose that two players can be linked to each other only if they belong
to the same coalition. Under a component additive partition value function v, strongly
e¢ cient community structures are contractually stable under the simple majority decision
rule and the component-wise majoritarian allocation rule.
Proof. Let f(g; P ) 2 GN  P j ij 2 g only if S(i) = S(j)g be the set of feasible coalitional
networks. Then, for any component additive partition value function v, the component-
wise majoritarian allocation rule Y cm is such that for any (h; S) 2 C(g; P ), Y cmi (g; P; v) =
v(h; S)[#S2 + mod[#S; 2]]
 1 8i 2 S0  S and Y cmi (g; P; v) = 0 8i 2 S00  S, with S0\S00 =
?, S0 [ S00 = S, #S0  #S00  #S2  mod[#S; 2], and iS
00
> j 8j 2 S0. Let (g; P ) be an
e¢ cient coalitional network with P = fS1 ; S2 ; :::; Smg. First, any deviation from (g; P )
to any (g0; P ) by a coalition S  Sj will be blocked because (g; P ) is e¢ cient and hence
in (g0; P ) players in S0  Sj are worse o¤ than in (g; P ) and players in S00  Sj are equal
o¤. Second, any deviation from (g; P ) to any (g0; P 0) by a coalition S = S1 [S2 [ ::: with
P 0 = P nfS1 ; S2 ; :::g[fS1[S2[:::g will be blocked by all the deviating players in S1[S2[:::
that now obtain a payo¤ of zero (and a positive payo¤ in (g; P )). Third, any deviation
from (g; P ) to any (g0; P 0) by a coalition S  Sj with P 0 = P n fSj g [ fS0j [S00j [ :::g and
Sj = S
0
j [ S00j [ ::: will be blocked by all the deviating players that now obtain a payo¤ of
zero in every S0j ; S
00
j ; :::, with S

j = S
0
j [ S00j [ ::: Fourth, any deviation from (g; P ) to any
(g0; P 0) by a coalition S with P 0 = P n fS1 ; S2g [ fSg [ fS1 n (S1 \ S)g [ fS2 n (S2 \ S)g
will be blocked by all the deviating players that now obtain a payo¤ of zero in (g0; P 0).
6 Conclusion
We have developed a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links
and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We have introduced the notion
of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network
species the nature of the relationship each individual has with her coalition members and
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with individuals outside her coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going
to emerge at equilibrium we have used the concepts of strong stability and of contractual
stability. Contractual stability requires that any change made to the coalitional network
needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We
have shown that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the
simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allo-
cation rules. However, once we adopt the component-wise dictatorial allocation rule, a
contractually stable coalitional network always exists only under the unanimity decision
rule. Hence, requiring the unanimity for consent may be too strong since it can help to
support extreme allocations. Finally, we have shown that requiring the consent of group
members under the simple majority or the unanimity decision rule may help to reconcile
stability and e¢ ciency of coalitional networks or community structures.
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